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Abstract: 
This paper presents new evidence on income-related health inequality and its 
development over time in Switzerland. We employ the methods lined out in van 
Doorslaer and Jones (2003) and van Doorslaer and Koolman (2004) measuring health 
using an interval regression approach to compute concentration indices and decomposing 
inequality into its determining factors. Nationally representative survey data for 1982, 
1992, 1997 and 2002 are used to carry out the analysis. Looking at each of the four years 
separately the results indicates the usual positive relationship between income and health, 
but the distribution is among the least unequal in Europe. No clear trend emerges in the 
evolution of the inequality indices over the two decades. Inequality is somewhat lower in 
1982 and 1992 as compared to 1997 and 2002 but the differences are not significant. The 
most important contributors to health inequality are income, education and activity status, 
in particular retirement. Regional differences including the widely varying health care 
supply, by contrast, do not exert any systematic influence. 
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1. Introduction 
Persistent differences in health and mortality by socio-economic status have long been 
observed in many countries. One strand of research to which the authors have contributed 
in previous work has focused on self-reported health and its distribution by income (Van 
Doorslaer et al. 1997), exploiting cross-national variations using comparable data for a 
number of European countries and the US. Concentration indices and curves were 
employed to test for differences in the extent to which self-reported health was unequally 
distributed across income. Van Doorslaer and Koolman (2004) have updated and 
extended this research using more recent data and new methods for thirteen European 
Union member states. Both publications reveal consistent health inequalities by income 
albeit with wide variations between the countries included. In van Doorslaer and 
Koolman (2004) Portugal in particular, but also the UK and Denmark show up with a 
high degree of income-related inequality, while countries like the Netherlands, Germany, 
but also Italy, Belgium, Spain, Austria and Ireland show a relatively low level of health 
inequality. 
 
This paper looks at the evolution of income-related inequality in health in selected years 
and its evolution over time in Switzerland, using nationally representative data sets for 
1982, 1992, 1997 and 2002, and employing the methods lined out in van Doorslaer and 
Jones (2003) and van Doorslaer and Koolman (2004). As in the studies mentioned above 
we use respondent’s self assessment as our measure of general health status. An interval 
regression approach is employed to compute concentration indices for health. Inequality 
is subsequently decomposed into its determining factors to explore potential causes of 
income-related health inequalities in each of the four years and of differences in 
inequality emerging over time. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the methods used to measure, 
explain and decompose the sources of inequality. The data and variables used are 
described in section 3, while the results are displayed in section 4. Finally, section five 
provides a discussion of the results and some conclusions. 
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2. Policy Changes in Switzerland over two decades 
The Swiss health system differs in a number of important features from other health care 
systems. It is consumer driven in that all permanent residents have to buy a compulsory 
insurance package individually from one of the competing health insurance companies, 
choosing among a variety of plans (fee-for-service, managed care, “bonus” option). In the 
traditional fee-for-service sector which still accounts for over 90% of all insurance 
contracts policies may be differentiated by deductible levels within a range set by the 
government (between CHF 300 and 1500 in 2002). By contrast, there is no deductible for 
HMO plans which closely manage access to providers. For costs exceeding the 
deductible there is a coinsurance rate of 10% up to a limit which is determined by the 
government as well in the fee-for-service sector (presently CHF 700). In addition a co-
payment of CHF 10 per day is required for every hospital day. This rather extensive cost-
sharing constitutes one of the reasons why out-of-pocket payments which may not be 
insured against amounted to 31.7% of total health expenditures in 2001. A second reason 
is that dental care is not covered by compulsory insurance except in case of accident or 
severe dental problems. Premiums for compulsory insurance policies may only be 
differentiated by canton, type of region (urban, suburban or rural) and age (reduced 
premiums for children and young adults). To ease the financial hardship associated with 
per capita premiums, government provides means-tested benefits to low income 
residents. In 2001 roughly one third of the insured were subsidized to some extent, and 
about 15% of all enrolee premium payments were paid by the government. Subsidies are 
paid if the premiums exceed a certain percentage of household income – usually 8%-
10%. The maximum amount paid is typically the mean of the premiums of all insurance 
companies in the canton. Essentially, this means that the poor get free care. A more 
comprehensive description of the Swiss health care system is provided in Leu and 
Schellhorn (2004). 
 
Most of the institutional features described above have been brought about by the 
1996 reform of the Health Insurance Law. Three main goals were pursued with this major 
reform: a) Extension of the insurance coverage for the entire population furthering equal 
access (universal coverage, expansion of the compulsory basic insurance package); b) 
 3
increase in solidarity between the healthy and the sick, the rich an the poor and men and 
women (flat insurance premiums, premium subsidies and universal access to compulsory 
health insurance); c) reduction in cost inflation (increased cost-sharing, introduction of 
managed care plans, possibility of enforcing fixed budgets on hospitals). There is 
widespread agreement that the first two goals have been achieved to a considerable 
degree, while cost inflation remains a major problem. Extended insurance coverage and 
increased solidarity can be expected to have increased equity in utilization and hence 
income-related equality in health. In addition, supplementary insurance coverage which is 
known to contribute to inequities in use has decreased since 1996 due to the extension of 
the compulsory insurance package. By contrast, the instruments of the revised law aiming 
at reducing costs, in particular increased cost-sharing and managed care options tend to 
reduce equity in access and might therefore have increased income-related inequality in 
health. Since neither explicit rationing nor sizable queues have been observed so far we 
do not expect, on the other hand, that the possibility of imposing a fixed budget on public 
hospitals has influenced the distribution of health care or health. Overall, we are left 
without a clear a priori hypothesis of whether the 1996 reform has increased or decreased 
income-related inequalities in health. Tackling this question therefore boils down to a 
purely empirical exercise, using nationwide representative survey data before and after 
1996 and keeping in mind that other factors may have exerted an influence over this 
extended period of time as well. 
 
3. Methods 
3.1. Measurement of health 
We use respondents’ self-assessments as a measure of general health status. Self-
assessed health (SAH) is a simple and subjective measure but has been shown to be a 
powerful predictor of subsequent mortality (Idler and Benyamini, 1997). Burström and 
Fredlund (2001) show that its predictive power does not vary systematically by SES and 
van Doorslaer and Gerdtham (2003) use this to carry out an analysis of inequalities in 
mortality. The answers to the question “How is your health in general?” which range 
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from “very good” to “very bad” provide an ordinal ranking of individuals’ perception of 
their health status. To analyze income-related inequalities in health we need to 
cardinalize the information contained in the SAH. Several methods have been used in the 
literature on health inequalities. We follow the methods lined out in van Doorslaer and 
Jones (2003), which were also previously applied in a cross-national comparison of 
health inequalities in European countries by van Doorslaer and Koolman (2004). The 
cumulative frequency of SAH is mapped to the empirical distribution of a generic health 
measure, the Canadian Health Utilities Index Mark III (HUI) which was developed by 
Feeny et al. (2002). To justify this procedure it is assumed that there is a stable mapping 
from HUI to the (latent) variable that determines SAH and that this mapping not only 
applies to Canadian individuals but to other European individuals as well. Upper and 
lower thresholds for the underlying health score of SAH are set by assigning the values of 
HUI which match the observed frequencies. Van Doorslaer and Jones show that this 
approach is superior to methods like dichotomizing the latent health score or assuming a 
specific underlying distribution of latent health as carried out in van Doorslaer et al. 
(1997).  
3.2. Measurement of inequality 
As in the related studies we are using the health concentration index as our measure 
of relative income related inequality. If we have a continuous measure of health (utility) 
yi then the concentration curve L(s) plots the cumulative proportion of the population 
(ranked by income) against the cumulative proportion of health. If L(s) coincides with the 
diagonal everyone enjoys the same health. If L(s) lies below the diagonal then 
inequalities in health exist which favour the rich. The larger the area between L(s) and the 
diagonal is, the larger are the inequalities. The concentration index is defined as twice the 
area between the concentration curve and the diagonal and is bounded between -1 and +1. 
The estimation and comparison of the inequality indices at different points in time 
requires representative and suitably weighted sample data. Kakwani et al. (1997) derive 
the formula for the concentration index to be 
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Wagstaff et al. (1991) show that C can be computed conveniently using the weighted 
covariance of µ  and the fractional rank as  
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3.3. Decomposing inequality 
If health can be specified with a linear additive model of the form 
[5] i k k
k
y xα β ε= + +∑  
where the xk variables are health determinants and ε  is a disturbance term, then 
Wagstaff et al. (2003) propose a straightforward way of decomposing the measured 
degree of inequality. Given the relationship between health and its determinants the 
concentration index for y, C can be written as 
[6] ( / ) /k k k
k
C x C GCεβ µ µ= +∑  
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where kx  is the mean of xk, Ck is the concentration index for xk (defined analogously 
to C) and GCε  is the generalized concentration index for the disturbance term. This 
shows that the concentration index C is equal to a weighted sum of the concentration 
indices of the k regressors, where the weight for for regressor k is the elasticity of y with 
respect to xk.. The residual component reflects the inequality in health which is not 
explained by systematic variation across income groups in the regressors. In the case of 
the interval regression approach, no residuals can be computed and the decomposition 
reduces to the first term of the previous equation. As the boundaries of the categories are 
defined with this approach it is possible to carry out interval regression which is more 
efficient than the standard methods of ordered probit or logit. The linear index ix β  from 
the interval regression gives a measure of predicted health utility given an individual has 
characteristics x. This index is suitable for decomposition because it is linear and 
continuous.  
The estimated health elasticity of determinant k can be defined as  
[7] ˆˆ /k k kxη β µ≡  
which in turn can be used to rewrite the decomposition as  
[8]  ˆ ˆk k
k
C Cη=∑
The estimated health inequality is just a weighted sum of inequality in each of its 
determinants with the weights equal to the health elasticities of the determinants. 
Consequently, total inequality can be partitioned into avoidable and unavoidable 
components as in Kakwani et al. (1997). Following epidemiological conventions the 
unavoidable part is income-related health inequality due to demographics. Applying the 
method of indirect standardization one can compute the age-sex expected inequality as 
C* and subtract this from C to obtain an estimate of potentially avoidable inequality as I* 
= C – C*. In principle, C* could be derived from a prediction of y on the basis of age and 
gender only, i.e. including only age and gender in the regression which is used to 
calculate . Schokkaert and van der Voorde (2004) and Gravell(2001) show that the 
indirect standardization approach has the advantage that only the partial effects of age 
Ĉ
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and gender are controlled for as the estimations do not suffer from a potential omitted 
variable bias. Also, the unavoidability of age and gender related inequalities in health are 
contentious. Decomposing the total income-related inequalities into all its components 
leaves the decision on which inequalities are deemed acceptable to the reader. With the 
decomposition analysis it is possible to further disentangle the contribution of each 
determinant k into two separate parts and to quantify the importance of these two parts. 
First, the impact of determinant k on health is measured by the health elasticity kη . 
Second, the degree of unequal distribution across income is measured by the (income) 
concentration index Ck. 
4. Data and variable definitions 
The data used in this paper were taken from four nationwide representative cross-
sectional data sets, the survey on Socio-Medical Indicators for the Population of 
Switzerland (SOMIPOPS) which was collected in 1982, and the Swiss Health Surveys 
(SHS) 1992, 1997 and 2002. While the latter three use almost identical questions, there 
are some notable differences between SOMIPOPS and the SHS data sets. First, while the 
information on household income in SOMIPOPS is derived from official tax records (see 
Leu et al. (1986)) income in the SHS data is self-reported. We cannot exclude that the 
substantial increase in income from 1982 to 1992 is at least partly due to this difference 
in data source. In the present context, this causes a problem only if the two income 
variables lead to a different ranking of individuals by income. Second, the self-assessed 
health question in SOMIPOPS has only four categories (very good, good, fair, bad) while 
the SAH questionnaire contains five items ranging from “very good” to “very bad”. The 
HUI threshold values for the five SAH categories in the SHS data are taken from van 
Doorslaer and Jones (2003): 0, 0.428, 0.756, 0.897, 0.947 and 1. No threshold values are 
available in the literature for the four categories of the SAH question in the SOMIPOPS 
data. The relative frequencies of the three upper categories in the SOMIPOS data are only 
marginally larger than those of the three corresponding categories in the SHS data while 
the fourth lies in between the bottom two categories of the SHS data. Trying out various 
thresholds revealed that the results were not very sensitive to this choice. We used 
threshold values of 0, 0.55, 0.85 and 0.947 throughout the analysis since they produced a 
 8
predicted HUI using the SOMIPOPS SAH question which is similar in size to the one 
predicted using the SHS data. Nevertheless, comparability of the 1982 results with those 
of the subsequent survey years remains somewhat limited. Table 1 displays descriptive 
statistics for the four data sets. While the proportion of respondents reporting very good 
or good health remained remarkably stable at around 85%, the prevalence of self-reported 
chronic conditions decreased from 39% in 1982 to 25 % in 2002. Over the same period 
reported problems with ADL increased from 5% to 17%. However, the analysis of health 
inequalities pursued in this paper is based exclusively on SAH as health indicator. 
5. Results 
Table 2 presents the results from the interval regressions of health on log-income, age, 
gender, educational attainment, activity status, region of residence, a dummy for 
supplementary insurance and the individually chosen deductible in the years 1997 and 
2002. The omitted reference categories are being a male at age 18-35, working full-time, 
living in the cantons around Lake Geneva, and having chosen the minimal mandatory 
deductible (150 CHF in 1997 and 230 CHF in 2002).  
 
In all four years income has a positive and significant direct effect on health, increasing 
until 1997 and then dropping back to the 1992 level. While health decreases substantially 
with age for both genders in 1982, there appears to be no systematic age gradient in the 
subsequent three survey years. The 1982 age health gradient might at least in part be 
caused by the different collection of SAH in that year as compared to the subsequent 
years. An alternative explanation might be that health levels of the elderly have improved 
over time due to a variety of factors such as better education, higher living standards, 
better medical care etc. Incidentally, the lacking of a significant age health gradient also 
indicates that respondents tend to rate their health relative to their own health and gender 
group. Retired respondents report a worse SAH compared to the reference group of 
(fully) working individuals. The coefficient is increasing in absolute size over the years 
and is significant after 1992. This offers another explanation for the disappearing age 
effect on health after 1982. In the first observation year the number of early retirees is 
relatively small which leads to almost collinear variables for age over 65 and retirement. 
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Thus the 1982 age gradient in health seems to pick up at least partly the retirement effect 
of the later years.  
 
The effect of a higher education on health appears to be relatively stable in all four years. 
More educated people seem to be in better health with the coefficient for higher 
education ranging between 0.12 and 0.19 in all four years. The impact of the region of 
residence is insignificant with the exception of the Italian speaking canton of Ticino 
where the respondents systematically rate their health worse than in the other cantons. In 
the last two observation years, individuals who opted for a higher deductible were in 
better health than those with the mandatory minimum deductible. The main explanation 
for this finding appears to be that the choice of deductible contains information on 
unobserved aspects of health (self-selection of good risks into higher deductibles). This 
argument is in line with studies by Schellhorn (2001, 2002a,b), Werblow and Felder 
(2003) and Gardiol et al. which all point to the existence of strong health-related choices 
of insurance contracts.  
 
In figure 1 we present the concentration indices for health in the four observation years 
along with a decomposition analysis. The CI of predicted HUI increases from 0.0036 in 
1982 to 0.0045 in 2002. In a recent study van Doorslaer and Koolman (2004) compare 
income-related inequalities in health of 13 EU countries. The Swiss CI is close to the 
countries exhibiting the lowest degree of health inequality in this study (the Netherlands 
and Germany) while countries with the most unequal distribution of health, Portugal and 
the UK, report a CI which is three to four times larger.  
 
Figure 2 shows the result of the decomposition analysis for the four years. For most 
variables the CI stays relatively stable over time. The contributions of theses variables to 
inequality move in parallel to the regression coefficients discussed above. Obviously, the 
most important contribution to income-related inequalities in health stems from a direct 
income effect. The second most important contributor is higher education. In the last 
three observation periods activity status starts to add substantially to a pro-rich-
distribution of health. This effect is mainly driven by the increased contribution of 
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retirement. At the same time the contribution of age disappears after 1982. As mentioned 
above the most likely explanation for this is that the retirement effect in 1982 is at least 
partly captured by age. 
 
Looking at the decomposition analysis in more detail in table 3 indicates that the direct 
effect of income is by far the most important contributing factor to income-related 
inequalities in health. Between 55% and 62% of total inequality are explained by this 
direct effect in the first three observation years, which subsequently decreases to about 
43% in 2002. The effect of income is the result of a pro-rich CI of log-income which is 
around 0.35 in all four years and a positive effect of income on health.  
 
The second factor which contributes to a pro-rich distribution of health is high 
educational attainment. Obviously, income is positively correlated with education. The 
CI of having a university degree is quite large at around 0.3. The positive effect of higher 
education on health may be caused by various mechanisms. Individuals with higher 
education tend to have a less physically demanding work environment, for example. 
Human capital theory on the other hand predicts that the better educated are more 
efficient producers of health because they have better knowledge of healthy behaviour or 
life styles.  
 
A third factor which has gained importance in explaining income-related health 
inequalities is activity status, in particular retirement. Due to the aging of the population 
and early retirement schemes the proportion of retirees in our data has more than doubled 
from 9% in 1982 to 21% in 2002. The CI of the dummy variable for retirement is 
negative, indicating that retired individuals are concentrated among those with low 
income. The CI for retirement reaches its minimum of -0.21 in 1992 and increases to -
0.136 until 2002. This increase (in absolute value) of the CI indicates that the mandatory 
capital-funded pension system has reduced the concentration of low-income individuals 
among the retired in the second decade of our observation period. The estimated 
coefficients on retirement become significantly more negative over time. However, it is 
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not clear whether retirement has a negative impact on health or whether people retire 
earlier because they are in bad health. 
 
Regional differences do not seem to add systematically to income-related health 
inequalities in Switzerland. High incomes are concentrated in the North-West of 
Switzerland (the cantons of Basel City, Basel Country and Aargau) and the cantons of 
Zurich and Geneva but the marginal effects appear to vary unsystematically across 
regions. 
6. Discussion and Conclusions 
This paper adds considerably to the existing knowledge on inter-individual health 
disparities by income in Switzerland. First, it uses more recent data than the existing 
literature. Second, it is not restricted to a cross-section approach for one survey year but 
investigates the evolution of income-related inequality in health over the last two decades 
as well. Third, it achieves a more consistent and reliable estimate of the degree of health 
inequalities by using an interval regression approach to estimate more fully specified 
health (utility) equations. Finally, the decomposition method we use allows for the 
decomposition of total observed income-related health inequality into the contributions of 
the health elasticity and the inequality by income for all health determinants included in 
the analysis. 
 
As expected we find income-related inequalities in health in all four observation years. 
However, no systematic trend emerges over time although the index value is 
insignificantly higher in 20002 than in 1982. Comparing the former index value to those 
reported in a recent study by van Doorslaer and Koolman (2004) indicates that the 
distribution of health by income in Switzerland is among the least unequal in Europe. 
Only the Netherlands exhibit lower income-related inequality in health. 
 
That there is no systematic variation in income-related inequality over time comes at no 
surprise. Income inequality has not changed much over the past 20 years. The same is 
true for income-related inequality in health care utilization (see Leu and Schellhorn 
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2004). Increased life expectancy has increased the proportion of the elderly in the 
population which tend to report lower self-assessed health, other things equal. This may 
be one of the reasons for the insignificantly higher index values in 1997 and 2002. This 
aging population effect may have been dampened by the fact that older residents tend to 
be in increasingly better health and to live independently longer for a variety of reasons 
such as higher living standards, better education, better nutrition or better medical care. 
Finally, since the 1996 health care reform has not systematically influenced utilization 
and its distribution by income, we cannot expect any measurable effect on health. This is 
compatible with the evolution of the most important health indicators, like life 
expectancy at birth, which tend to improve systematically over time but show no reaction 
to changes in the health care system (WHO 2004). 
 
The decomposition of the measured health inequalities consistently shows in all four 
years that income is the most important contributor to income-related inequality. The 
second most important contributor is educational achievement while the third is activity 
status, in particular retirement. These results coincide with those of the most recent 
international comparison (van Doorslaer and Koolman 2004). Contrary to this study, no 
significant contribution of regional effects, including the widely differing health care 
supply, can be found for Switzerland. This coincides with the observation that there is no 
correlation between self-assessed health and the number of physicians by canton. 
 
Retirement is the factor which has increased its contribution to income-related health 
inequality most dramatically over the last two decades. Since our analysis does not lend 
itself to any casual conclusions this observation is hard to interpret. In particular, it is not 
clear whether it is due to increased early retirement because of bad health or to retired 
individuals being in less good health as compared to those who are still working. This 
certainly is a finding that warrants further inspection. 
 
This last point brings us to the limits of this study. As explained in section 3, the 
estimated health equations do not generally allow for any casual interpretation. The 
partial cross-sectional association between income and health as measured in the 
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regression coefficient of (log) income may to some extent also reflect reverse causality or 
joint determination by some unobserved underlying factor. The same is true for some 
other variables, in particular labour force participation. A second caveat concerns the 
validity of the threshold values which were taken from a Canadian study by van 
Doorslaer and Koolman (2004) and which also influenced the values chosen for the 1982 
survey. Recent research (see van Doorslaer and Koolman 2004) as well as our own 
computations indicates, however, that the results are not very sensitive to the choice of 
these threshold values. Finally, comparability of the 1982 data to the subsequent surveys 
is somewhat restricted. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
1982 1992 1997 2002
N 3981 9764 9827 13692
SAH very good 0.24 0.27 0.27 0.24
SAH good 0.63 0.57 0.58 0.62
SAH average/fair 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.11
SAH bad 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.03
SAH very bad 0.01 0.00 0.00
Chronic condition 0.39 0.29 0.30 0.25
ADL 0.05 0.12 0.16 0.17
ln(income) 7.42 7.94 8.12 7.96
Male 18-35 0.09 0.19 0.16 0.12
Male 35-45 0.21 0.10 0.11 0.12
Male 45-64 0.13 0.15 0.16 0.18
Male 65-74 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05
Male 75+ 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.03
Female 18-35 0.10 0.19 0.15 0.11
Female 35-45 0.20 0.10 0.10 0.11
Female 45-64 0.12 0.16 0.15 0.16
Female 65-74 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.06
Female 75+ 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.05
second. Education 0.49 0.57 0.63 0.64
University degree 0.16 0.22 0.18 0.18
employed 0.40 0.53 0.58 0.60
self-employed - 0.09 0.10 0.10
part-time 0.12 - -
housewife /-man 0.36 0.18 0.08 0.06
trainee 0.02 0.08 0.02 0.01
retired 0.09 0.11 0.19 0.21
unemployed 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01
Lale Geneva 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.19
Espace Mittelland 0.23 0.24 0.23 0.24
North-West CH 0.16 0.14 0.14 0.13
Zurich 0.14 0.17 0.17 0.18
East CH 0.17 0.14 0.14 0.13
Central CH 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09
Ticino 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05
Suppl. Insurance 0.50 0.53 0.39 0.31
HMO 0.04 0.06
Deductible 150/230 0.58 0.37
Deductible 300/400 0.31 0.25
Deductible 600 0.01 0.16
Deductible 1200 0.08 0.05
Deductible 1500 0.02 0.17
 17
coef. t-value coef. t-value c
lninc 0.004 3.16 0.005 3.28
Male 35-45 -0.002 -0.45 -0.003 -1.18
Male 45-64 -0.022 -4.71 -0.012 -4.74
Male 65-74 -0.034 -3.89 -0.004 -0.69
Male 75+ -0.040 -2.71 0.001 0.06
Female 18-35 0.000 -0.08 -0.004 -1.60
Female 35-45 -0.006 -1.16 -0.005 -1.47
Female 45-64 -0.024 -4.30 -0.012 -4.56
Female 65-74 -0.029 -4.21 -0.008 -1.52
Female 75+ -0.069 -4.70 -0.318 -5.10
second. Education 0.012 3.85 0.010 4.07
University degree 0.019 5.05 0.013 4.52
self-employed 0.002 1.08
part-time -0.015 -3.38
housew ife /-man 0.001 0.41 0.000 0.03
trainee 0.022 3.76 0.010 3.10
retired -0.005 -0.71 -0.017 -3.31
unemployed -0.059 -1.12 -0.016 -1.75
Espace Mittelland 0.001 0.25 -0.002 -0.76
North-West CH -0.001 -0.13 -0.011 -4.27
Zurich 0.011 2.68 -0.007 -2.80
East CH 0.006 1.44 -0.005 -1.87
Central CH 0.010 2.03 -0.006 -2.00
Ticino -0.018 -2.14 -0.016 -3.47
Suppl. Insurance 0.001 0.20 0.006 4.08
HMO
Deductible 300/400
Deductible 600
Deductible 1200
Deductible 1500
Constant 0.860 60.35 0.8813 69.7900
Table 2: Health interval regression 
1982 1992
oef. t-value coef. t-value
0.010 3.45 0.006 4.04
-0.009 -3.34 -0.005 -2.38
-0.012 -4.03 -0.011 -4.67
0.009 1.45 0.018 3.51
0.015 1.90 0.001 0.11
-0.002 -0.76 0.000 -0.01
-0.010 -3.25 -0.004 -1.77
-0.009 -3.47 -0.006 -2.69
0.008 1.36 0.015 2.44
0.009 1.30 0.009 1.45
0.014 4.95 0.014 6.22
0.018 5.91 0.014 5.38
0.002 0.91 0.000 0.05
-0.001 -0.53 -0.003 -0.90
0.009 2.79 0.006 0.96
-0.034 -6.02 -0.036 -7.36
-0.017 -1.72 -0.020 -2.49
-0.001 -0.29 0.000 -0.19
-0.001 -0.55 -0.007 -2.95
-0.007 -2.13 -0.001 -0.65
-0.001 -0.51 0.000 0.12
0.000 0.15 0.002 0.93
-0.014 -3.66 -0.010 -3.59
0.001 0.46 0.002 1.48
0.003 1.07 0.000 0.17
0.000 0.18 0.000 -0.22
0.001 0.09 0.005 3.07
0.005 1.57 0.007 2.89
0.013 3.81 0.012 7.35
0.841 37.23 0.865 68.88
20021997
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CI ME Contrib CI ME Contrib CI ME Contrib CI ME Contrib
HUI predicted 0.003636 0.00325 0.00474 0.00446
I*
lninc 0.035 0.004 59.01% 0.037 0.005 55.11% 0.032 0.010 62.80% 0.035 0.006 42.63%
Male 35-45 0.072 -0.002 -1.12% 0.040 -0.003 -0.47% 0.076 -0.009 -1.89% 0.030 -0.005 -0.44%
Male 45-64 0.143 -0.022 -17.02% 0.097 -0.012 -6.20% 0.190 -0.012 -9.12% 0.045 -0.011 -2.21%
Male 65-74 0.125 -0.034 -10.03% -0.100 -0.004 0.77% 0.011 0.009 0.13% -0.078 0.018 -1.91%
Male 75+ -0.238 -0.040 5.16% -0.318 0.001 0.00% -0.135 0.015 -1.20% -0.116 0.001 -0.07%
Female 18-35 -0.153 0.000 0.25% -0.019 -0.004 0.45% -0.041 -0.002 0.24% 0.046 0.000 0.00%
Female 35-45 0.007 -0.006 -0.32% -0.034 -0.005 0.56% -0.086 -0.010 2.15% -0.055 -0.004 0.62%
Female 45-64 0.063 -0.024 -6.98% -0.004 -0.012 0.24% 0.022 -0.009 -0.76% 0.037 -0.006 -0.95%
Female 65-74 -0.144 -0.029 9.14% -0.328 -0.008 4.40% -0.285 0.008 -3.95% -0.164 0.015 -3.72%
Female 75+ -0.261 -0.069 16.04% 0.026 -0.318 -0.63% -0.335 0.009 -2.55% -0.197 0.009 -2.07%
second. Education 0.034 0.001 7.87% 0.001 0.010 0.12% -0.009 0.014 -1.91% 0.007 0.014 1.49%
University degree 0.266 -0.001 32.41% 0.270 0.013 25.99% 0.330 0.018 28.03% 0.308 0.014 19.29%
self-employed 0.028 0.002 0.20% -0.005 0.002 -0.03% -0.019 0.000 0.00%
part-time 0.008 0.011 -0.60%
housew ife /-man -0.040 0.001 -0.80% -0.158 0.000 -0.06% -0.204 -0.001 0.60% -0.157 -0.003 0.61%
apprentice/student -0.495 0.022 -9.93% -0.198 0.010 -5.12% -0.197 0.009 -1.13% -0.242 0.006 -0.31%
retired -0.136 -0.005 2.54% -0.210 -0.017 13.57% -0.193 -0.034 32.22% -0.144 -0.036 27.13%
unemployed -0.504 -0.059 3.99% -0.198 -0.016 1.07% -0.208 -0.017 1.78% -0.167 -0.020 1.01%
Espace Mittelland -0.065 0.001 -0.57% -0.057 -0.002 0.74% -0.030 0.001 -0.26% -0.054 0.000 0.12%
North-West CH 0.087 -0.001 -0.32% 0.076 -0.011 -4.22% 0.268 0.003 0.84% 0.064 -0.007 -1.47%
Zurich 0.217 0.011 13.32% 0.163 -0.007 -6.99% 0.079 0.000 0.19% 0.150 -0.001 -0.93%
East CH -0.085 0.006 -3.44% -0.018 -0.005 0.41% -0.442 0.001 -0.07% -0.091 0.000 -0.09%
Central CH -0.179 0.010 -6.62% -0.038 -0.006 0.76% -0.070 0.005 -0.72% -0.036 0.002 -0.15%
Ticino -0.204 -0.018 6.65% -0.268 -0.016 6.56% -0.400 0.013 -2.76% -0.159 -0.010 1.86%
Suppl. Insurance 0.142 0.001 1.44% 0.124 0.006 12.75% 0.322 -0.001 -1.28% 0.242 0.002 4.07%
HMO 0.051 -0.001 -0.25% 0.098 0.000 0.07%
Deductible 300/400 0.064 -0.007 -1.90% -0.057 0.000 0.14%
Deductible 600 0.003 -0.001 -0.01% 0.077 0.005 1.57%
Deductible 1200 0.139 0.000 0.14% 0.158 0.007 1.42%
Deductible 1500 0.200 -0.014 -3.32% 0.155 0.012 7.83%
2002
Table 3: Concentration Indices and Decomposition
1982 1992 1997
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Figure 1: Health Inequality Indices
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Figure 2: Decomposition of Health Inequalities
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